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THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA:
HOW IN RE NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE
LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD
JENNIFER HINDS *
This Comment discusses renewed support for challenging the
National College Athletic Association (NCAA) waivers that bar its studentathletes from receiving compensation as unconscionable in light of the
recent Ninth Circuit holding in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and
Licensing Litigation (In re NCAA Student-Athlete).
While critics
previously debated whether the NCAA waivers are unconscionable, the
Ninth Circuit’s holding that student-athletes have a right to publicity
strongly suggests that the waivers as they currently stand are no longer
enforceable.
Part II of this Comment provides a background on the NCAA waivers
and Electronic Arts’s (EA) use of the student-athletes’ images in their
videogames which lead to the suit. Part III then analyzes the Ninth Circuit
decision and finds that although the majority correctly denied EA’s antiSLAPP motion, it also should have considered the resulting effect that the
holding would have on the NCAA waivers. Part IV applies the doctrine of
unconscionability to the NCAA waivers, and addresses various
counterarguments. Ultimately, this Comment argues the NCAA waivers
are procedurally unconscionable because the prospective student-athletes
are unfairly surprised, and the student-athletes really have no meaningful
choice to play elsewhere. Also, the NCAA waivers are substantively
unconscionable because the NCAA and member schools retain the sole
right to profit from the student-athletes’ likeness. Part V concludes by
acknowledging that while unconscionability is still difficult to establish, In
re NCAA Student-Athlete opened the door for student-athletes to
successfully proceed by arguing that the clauses are unconscionable under
contract law.
*J.D., Loyola Law School, 2014; Santa Clara University undergraduate and former NCAA
student-athlete in Track and Field; 2014 J.D. Graduate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I
would like to thank Loyola Law Professors Bryan Hull and David Tunick for their ideas,
mentorship, support, and guidance with this Comment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“The fact remains—the NCAA is not exploiting current or former
student-athletes, but instead providing enormous benefit to them and the
public.” 1 National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) chief legal
officer Donald Remy made this statement in response to the intense public
scrutiny the NCAA received from In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and
Licensing Litigation (“In re NCAA Student-Athlete”). 2 He posited that In re
NCAA Student-Athlete consisted of “baseless theories supported only by
inaccurate speculation aimed at destroying amateurism in college
athletics[.]” 3
Contrary to Remy’s claims: [c]ompetition takes many forms. 4
Although this case raised questions about athletic competition on the
football field and the basketball court, it is principally about the rules
governing competition in a different arena—namely, the marketplace. 5
In re NCAA Student-Athlete is a recent Ninth Circuit case concerning
several former NCAA student-athletes who brought suit against Electronic
Arts (“EA”) and the NCAA for using their likeness without compensating
them. 6 There, the Ninth Circuit denied EA’s anti-SLAPP motion, which
allowed the case to go forward.7 Previously, the NCAA banned studentathletes from receiving compensation in the name of amateurism. 8
Although the NCAA did not explain its definition of amateurism, the
1. Patrick Vint, NCAA Comments on Ed O’Bannon Case in Middle of NFL Draft, SB
NATION (Apr. 26, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/4/26/4268
324/ed-obannon-lawsuit-ncaa-statement.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, No. 4:09-cv-03329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014), available at
http://i.usatoday.net/sports/!Invesitgations-and-enterprise/OBANNONRULING.pdf.
5. Id.
6. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268,
1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
7. See id. at 1269.
8. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09-1967 CW, at 1-2; see also
Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
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NCAA website claims that its Bylaws ensure that all its student-athletes
compete on equal footing. 9 Under these Bylaws, NCAA student-athletes
are contractually barred from receiving any compensation, aside from
scholarships, in relation to their participation in athletics. 10 NCAA Bylaw
12.5.2.1 specifically bans student-athletes from receiving any
compensation related to publicity and personal promotion.11 Bylaw
12.5.1.1.1 is even more restrictive in requiring student-athletes to
contractually relinquish their right of publicity to the member schools and
to the NCAA as a condition to participation in sports.12 Many NCAA
student-athletes, sports commentators, and fans have questioned the
fairness of this prohibition. 13
These NCAA restrictions have also spurred social commentary
concerning whether the restrictions legitimize the exploitation of studentathletes. 14 For instance, the popular comedy show South Park ridiculed the
NCAA Bylaws by comparing its exploitation of NCAA student-athletes to
the exploitation of drug-addicted new born children, or “crack babies.” 15
9. See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).
10. C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever, 38 S.
TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1084-85 (1997); see NCAA Division I Manual: 2012-2013, NCAA, 60-65,
available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/denv/genrel/auto_pdf/201314/misc_non_event/compliance-manual-13.pdf; see generally Robert A. McCormick & Amy
Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81
WASH. L. REV. 71 (2006).
11. NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, NCAA,
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/samf/genrel/auto_pdf/Media_Internet_Sites.pdf (last visited
Oct. 24, 2014); see In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
12. See NCAA Division I Manual: 2012-2013, NCAA, 71, http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/sc
hools/denv/genrel/auto_pdf/2013-14/misc_non_event/compliance-manual-13.pdf.
13. See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004);
Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism Rules,
13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 677 (2003); Matt Tracy, Johnny Manziel:
Twitter Outrage from Fans Over NCAA Suspension, LATIN POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 11:18 AM),
http://www.latinpost.com/articles/1777/20130829/johnny-manziel-twitter-outrage-fans-overncaa-suspension.htm.
14. See, e.g., Jason Whitlock, True Reform Isn’t Part of NCAA’s Agenda, FOX SPORTS
(June 6, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/collegefootball/story/True-reformisn%2527t-part-of-NCAA-agenda-president-Mark-Emmert-081111.
15. South Park: Crack Baby Athletic Ass’n (Comedy Central television broadcast May 25,
2011). Aptly titled Crack Baby Athletic Association, the episode likens the NCAA to the South
Park characters masquerading as a non-profit organization that cuts a deal with EA Sports to sell
the likeness of crack-addicted babies who fight each other for a crack-filled ball. Similar to the
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Cartman, a central character on South Park who is known for his
aggressive and prejudicial behavior, justifies his exploitation of the crack
babies by stating: “the Crack Baby Athletic Association is a storied
franchise. It was founded over twelve days ago, with a firm ethical code
that strictly states ‘benefits to players is detrimentalized [sic] to their wellbeing.’” 16 In stark contrast to the NCAA student-athletes, media and
entertainment conglomerates such as ESPN, CBS, FOX, and EA pay the
NCAA billions of dollars in annual revenue from licensing fees to
broadcast live coverage of NCAA sporting events. 17 The NCAA, in turn,
distributes some of this revenue to its member schools.18
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in In re NCAA StudentAthlete demonstrates that the NCAA can no longer use amateurism to
rationalize denying student-athletes just compensation for their
misappropriated images. 19 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Northern
District of California’s finding that NCAA student-athletes cannot
contractually relinquish their right of publicity, 20 and could sue EA for
using their likenesses in its popular college sports videogames. 21 While
this lofty decision correctly allows student-athletes to bring
misappropriation claims, the decision does not address the potential
consequences of rendering the NCAA Bylaws unconscionable, and as such,
unenforceable. 22 While some commentators have previously argued that
NCAA’s treatment of student athletes, the South Park characters do not allow the babies to
receive compensation. The episode also analogizes the NCAA restrictions to slavery, which is an
extreme, albeit understandable, comparison.
16. Id.
17. See Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, and the StudentAthlete, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 107, 108-09 (2012).
18. See id. at 108.
19. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas J., dissenting); see
generally Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8,
2010), aff'd sub nom. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d 1268.
20. See Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), aff'd sub nom. In re
NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d 1268.
21. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1284.
22. See generally Nathan McCoy & Kerry Knox, Comment, Flexing Union Muscle—Is it
the Right Game Plan for Revenue Generating Student-Athletes in Their Contest for Benefits
Reform with the NCAA?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1051 (2002).
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the waivers are not unconscionable, 23 the Ninth Circuit’s holding has
opened the door for renewed arguments that the waivers are, in fact,
unconscionable.
This Comment will argue that the Ninth Circuit’s holding should have
considered the underlying substantive concerns regarding the purpose of
amateurism, and the holding’s potential effect on the current NCAA
Bylaws. Part II will discuss the background of the NCAA Bylaws and
EA’s NCAA College Series videogames. Part III will describe In re NCAA
Student-Athlete, and examine the deficiencies of both the majority and
dissenting opinions. Part IV will address various counterarguments and
argue that the waivers are unconscionable. Part V will conclude by arguing
that student-athletes can attack the waivers on the basis of their
unconscionability.
II. BACKGROUND
This section will provide background information about the NCAA
Bylaws and EA’s NCAA College Series videogames to demonstrate how
the NCAA wrongly profited off of its student-athletes that recently
culminated in In re NCAA Student-Athlete.
A. The NCAA Bylaws
The NCAA is a nonprofit association comprised of over 1,200
institutions, conferences, organizations, and individuals that organize the
athletic programs of many U.S. colleges and universities. 24 The NCAA,
however, mandates that its athletic programs and the participating studentathletes must be amateur.25 As previously mentioned, the NCAA itself
does not explicate a definition of amateurism. 26 However, the Oxford
American Dictionary defines amateurism as “the views and principles of a
person who engages in an activity for pleasure rather than profit.” 27 The
23. See generally Kendall K. Johnson, Note, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 1 (2012).
24. See Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last
visited Oct.16, 2014).
25. See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct.16, 2014).
26. See generally id.
27. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 48 (Angus Stevenson & Christine A.
Lindberg eds., 3d ed. 2010) (emphasis added).
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NCAA alleges that amateurism is “a bedrock principle of college athletics”
and “crucial to preserving an academic environment in which acquiring a
quality education is the first priority.” 28 Thus, the NCAA ostensibly passed
its Bylaws so that no college player would have an unfair advantage over
others in an effort to promote education. 29
All prospective student-athletes must successfully receive amateurism
certification from the NCAA Eligibility Center to participate in sports
activities. 30 Upon passing the certification process, many student-athletes
also sign a National Letter of Intent, a binding agreement that the studentathlete not only commits to playing sports at a specific university, but also
commits to obeying the NCAA Bylaws. 31 Many students are still minors
when they sign a National Letter of Intent. 32 The National Letter of Intent
is a non-negotiable boilerplate contract that provides an ambiguous
loophole for institutions to nullify the contract if the student-athlete does
not meet the institution’s or the NCAA’s eligibility requirements. 33 But, it
does not provide the student-athletes with such a loophole if, for example,
the coach who recruited the athlete is fired or takes another job.34 The
irony is that a student-athlete’s amateurism status may be affected if he or
she is represented by an agent while signing the contract; therefore,
prospective student-athletes are expected to enter into these contracts only

28. Amateurism, supra note 25.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See Debra D. Burke et al., The NCAA Letter of Intent: A Voidable Agreement for
Minors?, 81 MISS. L.J. 265, 266-68 (2011) (arguing that individuals who signed NCAA Letters of
Intent as minors should be able to later disaffirm such an agreement on ground of infancy); see
also Orion Riggs, Note, The Façade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-College Athletics, 5
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 143 (1996). See generally Letter Becomes Null and Void,
NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT, http://www.nationalletter.org/nliProvisions/nullAndVoid.html
(last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
32. See Burke et al., supra note 31.
33. Leo J. White, The National Letter of Intent Violates Doctrine of Unconscionability,
CTS SPORTS LAW (Feb. 4, 2010), http://ctsportslaw.com/2010/02/04/the-national-letter-of-intentviolates-doctrine-of-unconscionability/.
34. Id.; see generally Michael J. Riella, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying the
Doctrine of Unconscionability and Condition Precedent to Effectuate Student-Athlete Intent
Under the National Letter of Intent, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2181, 2181-82 (2002).

THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/2/2015 1:58 PM

THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA

101

on the advice of their often legally unsophisticated parents.35 In some
situations, this may not constitute proper representation if their parents are
unfamiliar with the contractual process.36 Even if a student-athlete does
not sign a National Letter of Intent, he or she must still pass amateurism
certification through the NCAA Eligibility Center and sign NCAA waivers
where he or she agrees to follow the Bylaws in order to participate in
sports. 37
All student-athletes must strictly adhere to the NCAA amateurism
requirements to remain eligible for intercollegiate competition.38 If the
NCAA determines that a student-athlete violated a rule that affects his or
her eligibility, the NCAA can declare that student-athlete ineligible to
participate in further athletic activities.39 One of the most controversial
rules is NCAA Bylaw 12.5.2, which outlines non-permissible promotional
activities for student-athletes once they pass the certification process.40
Specifically, Bylaw 12.5.2.1 indicates that:
[s]ubsequent to becoming a student-athlete, an individual shall
not be eligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics if the
individual:
a. Accepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her
35. See Amateurism, supra note 25; Staff Reporter, The Truth Behind the National Letter
of Intent, NEON TOMMY (Apr. 29, 2010, 12:19 AM), http://www.neontommy.com/2010/04/nation
al-letter-of-intent.
36. See, e.g., White, supra note 33.
37. Amateurism, supra note 25; see generally The Truth Behind the National Letter of
Intent, NEON TOMMY (Apr. 29, 2010, 12:19 AM), http://www.neontommy.com/2010/04/nationalletter-of-intent (author explains that “[t]echnically, the National Letter of Intent is a voluntary
program . . . .”).
38. See Amateurism, supra note 25; see also Dan Wetzel, Latest college scandals again
reveal folly of NCAA rules, YAHOO SPORTS (Sept. 11, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/
news/ncaaf--latest-college-scandals-again-reveal-folly-of-ncaa-rules-210822795.html.
39. See Amateurism, supra note 25; see also Kent Sterling, After Long Illness,
Amateurism in College Football Passes Away, KENT STERLING.COM (Sept. 12, 2013),
http://kentsterling.com/2013/09/12/after-long-illness-amateurism-in-college-football-passesaway/ (describes corruption in college football as undermining the purpose of amateurism).
40. NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, NCAA, 1-2,
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/samf/genrel/auto_pdf/Media_Internet_Sites.pdf (last visited
Oct. 24, 2014); see generally Michael Rosenberg, NCAA Amateurism Rules Unfair, But Manziel
Not One To Challenge Them, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 28, 2014), http://www.si.com/collegefootball/2013/08/05/johnny-manziel-ncaa.
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name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly
the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind,
or
b. Receives remuneration for endorsing a commercial product
or service through the individual’s use of such product or
service. 41
Interestingly, student-athletes whose:
[n]ame or picture appears on commercial items . . . or is used
to promote a commercial product sold by an individual or
agency without the student-athlete’s knowledge or permission,
the student athlete (or the institution acting on behalf of the
student-athlete) is required to take steps to stop such an
activity in order to retain his or her eligibility for
intercollegiate athletes.42
However, the NCAA Bylaws interpret usage of a student-athlete’s
name and/or photo in a magazine or newspaper as exempt from the nonpermissible activity rule.43 Indeed, student-athletes are contractually bound
to refrain from participating in promotional activities, but must also try to
ensure that no one is wrongfully using their likeness. 44 In short, even if a
student-athlete wished to license his or her image, he or she could not do so
without potentially destroying his or her amateur status and rendering

41. NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, supra note 40; see Hart v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013) (“NCAA bylaws limit college athletes . . . to
receiving only non-athletic financial aid . . . which cover only tuition and various school-related
expenses.”).
42. NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, supra note 40 at 2. (emphasis
added).
43. Id.
44. Talor Bearman, Note, Intercepting Licensing Rights: Why College Athletes Need a
Federal Right of Publicity, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 85, 105 (2013) (discussing that the
student athlete must sign a contract allowing his or her name and picture be used by the NCAA,
the university he or she attends, and to the university’s athletic conference, but the athlete cannot
profit from his or her likeness without losing the ability to participate in NCAA athletic events);
see generally Regulation of Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Connection Between an
Athlete Agent and a Student Athlete, 15 U.S.C. § 7802 (2004).
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himself or herself ineligible to participate in college sports.45 Moreover,
under this strict standard, even if a student-athlete’s likeness is being used
without consent or knowledge, his or her amateur status will potentially be
destroyed if he or she does not take adequate steps to curb the activity. 46
Student-athletes are required to sign forms in order to participate in an
NCAA sport. 47 For example, by signing Form 08–3a, student-athletes
agree to the following: “You authorize the NCAA [or a third party acting
on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution, conference, local organizing
committee)] to use your name or picture to generally promote NCAA
championships or other NCAA events, activities, or programs.” 48 Finally,
in addition to Form 08-3a, student-athletes must observe NCAA Bylaw
Article 12.5.1.1, which provides:
A member institution or recognized entity thereof (e.g.,
fraternity, sorority or student government organization), a
member conference or a non-institutional charitable,
educational or nonprofit agency may use a student-athlete’s
name, picture or appearance to support its charitable or
educational activities or to support activities considered
incidental to the student-athlete’s participation in intercollegiate
athletics, provided the following conditions are met . . . 49
Thus, not only are student-athletes unable to profit from their
likenesses in any way, they also must contractually relinquish their rights
of publicity to the NCAA and member schools, which allows both entities
to profit off of their success. 50
45. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, J.J. Morrison and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA,
15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 277 (2008) (arguing that the NCAA agreement with student
athletes constitutes an unconscionable adhesion contract).
46. NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, supra note 40 (informational
articles and accompanying images of the student-athlete in a magazine or newspaper are excepted
as would be a television station’s broadcast of the event or its news coverage of the event in the
public domain).
47. Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss at *2-3, O'Bannon v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. However, the 2014 form does not include the language “you authorize the NCAA”
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The right of publicity, which has been referred to in connection with
the right of privacy, is defined as the right of an individual to control any
commercial use of his or her name, image, likeness, or some other
identifying aspect of identity. 51 This right, however, is subject to First
Generally, an individual can receive
Amendment implications.52
compensation for commercial use of his or her likeness because of its
inherent economic value.53 However, the above referenced Bylaws and
agreements essentially mean that student-athletes have no right of publicity
because they give the NCAA the sole ability to profit off their studentathlete’s images. 54
Of course, the NCAA claims that it bars student-athletes from
receiving compensation in the name of amateurism. 55 Nevertheless, the
NCAA fails to address how amateurism is preserved, for example, by not
compensating a student-athlete for using his or her image on a brochure to
promote ticket sales. 56 The NCAA also fails to address how amateurism is
preserved by using a student-athlete’s name on a jersey. 57 Additionally, the
NCAA licenses many student-athletic activities in exchange for
compensation and use of its logos. 58 In fact, the NCAA received revenues
that was included in forms for previous years. See generally Student-Athlete Statement—NCAA
Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI%20Form%2014-3a%20%20Student-Athlete%20Statement_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
51. Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir.
1996); see Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gums, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953);
see also Bearman, supra note 44.
52. See generally Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959.
53. See generally id.
54. See 15 U.S.C. § 7802 (2012).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 7802; see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, O'Bannon v.
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 4:09-cv-03329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014), available at
http://i.usatoday.net/sports/!Invesitgations-and-enterprise/OBANNONRULING.pdf; Bearman,
supra note 44.
56. See Allie Grasgreen, Opining on O’Bannon, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 23, 2013),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/04/23/experts-weigh-possible-outcomes-effects-ncaalikeness-lawsuit.
57. See id.
58. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas J., dissenting);
NCAA Will Not Renew EA Sports Contract, NCAA (July 17, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-will-not-renew-ea-sportscontract.

THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

7/2/2015 1:58 PM

THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA

105

of $871.6 million in the fiscal year 2011-2012, with 81% of the money
coming from television and marketing fees.59 One controversial licensing
agreement is the NCAA’s licensing agreement with EA, which has
intensified the debate concerning both the NCAA Bylaws’ ban on studentathletes receiving compensation and EA using the student-athletes’ images
without compensating them. 60
B. EA Sports’ NCAA Football and Basketball Series
In 2010, popular videogame distributor EA was the world’s thirdlargest gaming company, in terms of revenue, after Nintendo and
Activision Blizzard. 61 EA created EA Sports in 1991 for the sole purpose
of marketing its sports-themed videogames. 62 The brand soon evolved into
its own lucrative sub-label and began releasing college-sports themed
videogames, including the NCAA Football and NCAA Basketball series. 63
Although EA discontinued its NCAA Basketball franchise in 2010 because
of declining sales, its NCAA Football series has continued to be quite
popular. 64 Until June 2014, EA had a licensing agreement with the NCAA
to use its logos in EA Sports’ video games in exchange for paying the
NCAA a portion of their revenue. 65 Additionally, EA currently has a
59. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas J.,
dissenting).
60. NCAA Will Not Renew EA Sports Contract, NCAA (July 17, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-will-not-renew-ea-sportscontract; see also Rachel Axon & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Spokesman: ‘Suit Threatens College
Sports as We Know It’, USA TODAY SPORTS (July 19, 2013, 7:28 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/07/19/ncaa-ea-lawsuit-jake-fischer-jake-smithdarius-robinson-chase-garnham-moses-alipate-victor-keise/2569615/.
61. Top 25 Gaming Companies 2010, SOFTWARE TOP 100 (August 3, 2010, 7:45 AM),
http://archive.today/IXy2Y.
62. Electronic Arts Inc. History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE,
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/electronic-arts-inc-history/ (last visited Oct
24, 2014).
63. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271-1272 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013);
pastapadre, NCAA Basketball Series Officially Canceled, PASTAPADRE (Feb. 10, 2010, 11:02
AM), http://www.pastapadre.com/2010/02/10/ncaa-basketball-series-officially-canceled#more$id.
64. See Eamonn Brennan, No College Hoops Video Game? Bummer, ESPN (Sept. 21,
2010, 9:52 AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/id/15506/no-collegehoops-video-game-bummer.
65. See generally NCAA, supra note 60.
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license with the College Licensing Company (“CLC”), the NCAA’s
licensing agent, to use member school names, team names, uniforms, logos,
stadium fight songs, and other game elements. 66 Because of this licensing
agreement, member schools also receive a portion of the revenue generated
from CLC’s contract with EA. 67
Clearly, EA owes much of the success of its NCAA Football franchise
to EA’s focus on realism and detail—including the realistic sounds, game
mechanics and team mascots—by creating virtual versions of actual
stadiums, populating the stadiums with virtual athletes, coaches,
cheerleaders, and fans realistically rendered by EA’s graphic artists, and
incorporating sounds such as the crunch of the players’ pads and the roar of
the crowd. 68
In fact, the EA Sports Blog stated that “[e]ach year, NCAA Football
playbook designer Anthony White strives to make each team’s playbook
accurately represent their system and play style . . . [E]ach year, Anthony
adds in actual plays run by teams that can only be found in specific
playbooks.” 69 To accomplish this, EA attempts to match any “unique,
highly identifiable playing behaviors by sending detailed questionnaires to
team equipment managers.” 70 However, EA purports not to use the exact
likeness of the players in their NCAA Football series, citing NCAA Bylaw
12.5’s restriction on athletes receiving remuneration from any publicity and
the student-athlete’s surrender of their right of publicity. 71 Thus, unlike its
other sports videogame franchises, such as the Madden NFL Series, EA
does not license the likeness and identity rights for intercollegiate players.72

66. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013).
67. See generally Andy Staples, Ed O’Bannon v. the NCAA: A Complete Case Primer,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.si.com/college-football/2013/04/02/edobannon-ncaa-case-primer.
68. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 146.
69. Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 n.6.
70. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271.
71. See Student-Athlete Likeness Lawsuit Timeline, NCAA (Dec. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/student-athlete-likenesslawsuit-timeline (stating that the NCAA’s agreement with EA “clearly prohibits the use of names
and pictures of current student-athletes in [EA’s] electronic games”); Kanika Corley, Are
Videogame Manufacturers Permitted to Use Your Image for their Own Monetary Benefit, Without
Your Consent? Well, it depends . . ., ACCESS ATHLETES (June 22, 2013, 4:51 PM),
http://www.accessathletes.com/blog/keyword.cfm?keyword=%22EA%20Locker%22.
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In fact, EA omits the intercollegiate players’ names from their jerseys, and
assigns each player a different hometown than the player’s actual
hometown. 73
While EA claims the virtual players in the game do not represent real
life players, the videogame characters are truly representative of the actual
players’ positions, teams, heights, home states, and ethnicities. 74 NCAA
college football fans would definitely recognize their favorite players.75
For example, Alabama Crimson Tide fans can clearly recognize the
Alabama Crimson Tide Player Quarterback #10 character in NCAA
Football 2013 as corresponding to Alabama Crimson Tide quarterback AJ
McCarron in position, team, height, home state and ethnicity. 76
Moreover, the game allows amateur roster makers to manually
associate the actual players’ names and upload a roster file to a built-in
roster sharing system, like the EA Locker Feature, which permits remote
roster sharing online through Xbox Live or PlayStation Network. 77 The
Ninth Circuit states, “[u]sers can further alter reality in the game by
entering ‘Dynasty’ mode, where the user assumes a head coach’s
responsibilities for a college program for up to thirty seasons including
players from a randomly generated pool of high school athletes.” 78 Users

72. See Craig Powers, NCAA Abandons EA Sports License, but the CLC Ensures a
Realistic Future College Football Game, SB NATION (July 17, 2013, 3:20 PM),
http://www.cougcenter.com/wsu-cougars-football/2013/7/17/4533022/ncaa-14-15-EA-sportslicensing-clc-license; Samit Sarkar, NFL Licensing Deals for Madden Series Haven’t Expired,
Says EA, POLYGON.COM (Jan. 28, 2014, 6:24 PM), http://www.polygon.com/2014/1/28/5355462
/ea-madden-nfl-licensing-deals-havent-expired.
73. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271. But see Hart, 717 F.3d at 146.
74. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271; see also Adam Ramirez, EA Sports
Used Ex-NCAA Athletes’ Likeness Without Permission: 9th Cir., FINDLAW (July 31, 2013, 12:49
PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/courtside/2013/07/ea-sports-used-ex-ncaa-athletes-likenesswithout-permission-9th-cir.html.
75. See generally Ramirez, supra note 74.
76. See generally Jack Kerwin, Alabama Crimson Tide News: Time To Recognize AJ
McCarron, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/sportsnet/alab
ama-crimson-tide-news-time-recognize-aj-mccarron-857037; Tony Breland, AJ McCarron No. 4
Rated Player in EA Sports NCAA Football ’14, BAMAHAMMER.COM, http://bamahammer.com/20
13/06/11/aj-mccarron-no-4-rated-player-in-ea-sports-ncaa-football-14/#!bTix89 (last visited Oct.
24, 2014).
77. Corley, supra note 71; PS3/Xbox 360 NCAA Football 14 EA Locker Download
Directions, GAME ROSTERS, http://www.gamerosters.com/2014.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
78. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271-72.
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can also use “Campus Legend” mode to control a “virtual player from high
school through college, making choices related to practices, academics, and
social life.” 79 Thus, even though EA personally did not publish the names
of the student-athletes, it gives videogame players the ability to do so,
allowing users to associate the video game figures to the players.
Therefore, EA intentionally tried to emulate the players by making their
game as realistic as possible.80 As a result of this obvious appropriation,
EA has been named a party in many controversial lawsuits, the most recent
of which reached the Ninth Circuit in In re NCAA Student-Athlete. 81
Because of the legal uncertainty surrounding the issue, EA has
discontinued the game despite its incredible popularity. 82 This is obviously
a negative consequence because it prevents consumers from playing
popular games. However, this situation could have been prevented had EA
decided to compensate the former student-athletes as it does for its Madden
NFL Series. 83
III. IN RE NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE NAME &
LIKENESS LICENSING LITIGATION: THE SIGNIFICANT DECISION
This section will discuss the seminal case In re NCAA Student-Athlete
by summarizing the factual and procedural background of the case and
analyzing the majority and the dissent.
A. Factual Background
Samuel Keller (“Keller”) was a starting quarterback at Arizona State
University (“ASU”) in 2005, and later transferred to the University of
Nebraska (“Nebraska”), where he played during the 2007 football season.84
79. Id. at 1272.
80. See id. at 1271.
81. See id. at 1268; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 145.
82. Dave Singleton, EA Sports to Discontinue NCAA Football Game, BLOGUIN (Sept. 27,
2013, 3:21 PM), http://www.bloguin.com/crystalballrun/2013-articles/september/ea-sports-todiscontinue-ncaa-football-game.html.
83. See Curt Feldman & Tim Surette, Big Deal: EA and NFL Ink Exclusive Licensing
Agreement, GAMESPOT (Dec. 13, 2004), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/big-deal-ea-and-nflink-exclusive-licensing-agreement/1100-6114977/.
84. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271
(9th Cir. 2013).
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In order to participate in NCAA sports at both ASU and Nebraska, Keller
signed waivers agreeing to abide by the NCAA’s Bylaws to maintain his
amateur status. 85
In the 2005 edition of EA’s NCAA Football Series, the virtual starting
quarterback from ASU wore the same number as Keller, number 9, and
also had the same height, weight, skin tone, hair color, hair style,
handedness, home state, play style, visor preference, facial features, and
school year. 86 In 2007, Keller transferred to Nebraska.87 When EA Sports
came out with the 2008 edition of the game, the virtual quarterback from
Nebraska had the exact same characteristics as the 2005 virtual starting
quarterback from ASU, except for the jersey number. 88 The Ninth Circuit
attributed this jersey number deviation to Keller changing his jersey
number right before the start of the 2008 season.89
Ed O’Bannon also competed as an NCAA student-athlete for the
University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”). 90 He was a member of
the UCLA Men’s Basketball team from 1991 to 1995, 91 a starter on
UCLA’s 1995 Championship team, and the 1995 NCAA Basketball
Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player. 92 Similar to Keller, O’Bannon
was a star member of the team and participated pursuant to the rules and
regulations of the NCAA, specifically NCAA Bylaw Articles 12.5.1 and

85. See id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1272.
87. Id. at 1271.
88. Id. at 1272.
89. Id.
90. O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
91. Id.; see also Karen Gullo and Matt Levenson, Ex-NCAA Quarterback Sues Electronic
Arts Over Games (Update 2), BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2009, 6:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aE3SJ3nIciB8&refer=us.
92. Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against the N.C.A.A.,
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-obannons-suitagainst-the-ncaa.html; see Hilary Russ, Athletes’ Licensing Fight Survives NCAA’s Bid to Toss,
LAW360 (Feb. 8, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/148446/athletes-licensingfight-survives-ncaa-s-bid-to-toss.
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12.5.2.1. 93 O’Bannon also alleges that EA misappropriated his image by
using his likeness and the same stats for his character (as EA did with
Keller’s character) in the 1995 edition of their now defunct NCAA
Basketball Series. 94
B. Procedural History
On May 5, 2009, Keller filed a putative class action lawsuit in the
Northern District of California against EA Sports and the NCAA, claiming
misappropriation of student-athletes’ images that were used in the NCAA
Football and NCAA Basketball series. 95 He also claimed that EA and the
NCAA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code § 3344
and California common law. 96 On July 21, 2009, Ed O’Bannon also filed a
lawsuit against the NCAA and the CLC in the Northern District of
California, alleging that NCAA waivers violated the Sherman Act and
wrongly deprived him of his right of publicity. 97 On September 1, 2009,
Keller and O’Bannon moved to consolidate their cases; the district court
granted these motions to consolidate all related actions on January 15,
2010. 98
EA, the NCAA and the CLC collectively moved to dismiss Keller’s
Complaint; EA also moved separately to strike the Complaint and dismiss
the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”)
93. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL
1642256, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011); In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
94. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 2011 WL 1642256, at *3.
95. Complaint, Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 3:09-CV-01967, 2009 WL 1270069 (N.D.
Cal. May 5, 2009).
96. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1272.
97. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 2011 WL 1642256, at *4; see also Kurt Streeter, Former
UCLA Star Ed O’Bannon Leads Suit Against NCAA Over Use of Images, L.A. TIMES (July 22,
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/22/sports/sp-videogames-lawsuit22; Jon Solomon,
Timeline: Ed O’Bannon vs. NCAA, CBS SPORTS (June 6, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.cbssports.
com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24581878/timeline-ed-obannon-v-ncaa.
98. Plaintiffs Samuel Michael Keller’s and Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr.’s Notice of Joint
Motion and Motion to Consolidate Actions, Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 4:09-cv01967-CW,
2009 WL 2920919 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009); Order Granting Plaintiffs Samuel Michael Keller’s
and Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr.’s Joint Motion to Consolidate Actions, Keller v. Electronic Arts,
Inc., 4:09-cv-01967-CW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010).
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under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure
§ 425.16. 99 The anti-SLAPP motion under California law provides for a
special motion that a defendant can file at the outset of a lawsuit to strike a
complaint when it arises out of conduct that falls within the protection of
the First Amendment. 100 The anti-SLAPP law is designed to prevent
people from trying to chill free speech rights by suing people who are
exercising these rights. 101 In this case, EA argued that they were exercising
their First Amendment right to free speech when they used the studentathletes’ likenesses in the game. 102 If EA had successfully established that
they were attempting to exercise their First Amendment rights, the burden
would have shifted to the plaintiffs to show that they would likely succeed
on the merits, meaning that the speech was not protected.103 The district
court denied the anti-SLAPP motion because they found that the plaintiffs
had established that they would likely succeed on the merits. 104 EA
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.105
On appeal, EA raised four affirmative First Amendment defenses
under the anti-SLAPP motion that would have immunized them from any
liability to the student-athletes: the “‘transformative use’ test, the Rogers
test, the ‘public interest’ test, and the ‘public affairs’ exemption.” 106 EA
also argued that even if their First Amendment defenses failed, NCAA
student-athletes have no right of publicity because, pursuant to NCAA
Bylaws, they contractually assigned their right of publicity to the NCAA
and its member schools, and thus, the Bylaws prohibited them from
receiving compensation. 107
99. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1272.
100. See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2014).
101. Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 95, 103 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating
that the policy reasoning behind anti-SLAPP law was to prevent the chilling of First Amendment
free speech rights).
102. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1273.
103. See generally CIV. PROC. § 425.16.
104. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1279.
105. See id. at 1272.
106. Id. at 1273.
107. See id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision and
held that EA’s affirmative defenses did not trump the plaintiffs’ right of
publicity claims. 108 Importantly, the court’s denial of EA’s anti-SLAPP
motion arguably demonstrates that Keller, O’Bannon, and the other
student-athletes would probably succeed on the merits in proving that EA’s
conduct fell outside of First Amendment protection because EA violated
the student-athletes’ right of publicity. Consequently, the majority did not
address EA’s defense on the basis of the NCAA waivers. 109 In fact, that
component was not addressed in O’Bannon antitrust action.110
Judge Thomas strongly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding. 111
While the dissent was primarily concerned with the belief that EA satisfied
the transformative use doctrines, the dissent also addressed the NCAA
waivers by stating:
Finally, as a qualitative matter, the publicity rights of college
athletes are remarkably restricted. This consideration is critical
because the “right to exploit commercially one’s celebrity is
primarily an economic right.” NCAA rules prohibit athletes
from benefitting economically from any success on the field.
NCAA Bylaw 12.5 specifically prohibits commercial licensing
of an NCAA athlete’s name or picture. Before being allowed to
compete each year, all Division I NCAA athletes must sign a
contract stating that they understand the prohibition on licensing
and affirming that they have not violated any amateurism rules.
In short, even if an athlete wished to license his image to EA,
the athlete could not do so without destroying amateur status.
Thus, an individual college athlete’s right of publicity is
extraordinarily circumscribed and, in practical reality,

108. See id. at 1284.
109. See id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110. Steve Berkowitz, Judge Releases Ruling on O'Bannon Case: NCAA Loses, USA
TODAY (Aug. 8, 2014, 11:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/08/edobannon-antitrust-lawsuit-vs-ncaa/13801277/; see generally John Solomon, EA and CLC Settle
Lawsuit by Ed O’Bannon Plaintiffs; NCAA Remains As Lone Defendant; AL.COM (Sept. 28,
2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/09/ea_will_not_make_college_footb.ht
ml.
111. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1290 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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nonexistent. 112
The dissent also argued that the majority mistakenly equated the right
of publicity for student-athletes with that of professional athletes, because
the, “marketing power of [professional NFL athletes] is well established,
while that of the plaintiffs [student-athletes] is not.” 113
On September 26, 2013, EA and CLC settled all of the claims brought
against them. 114 The terms of the settlement will remain confidential until
presented to the district court for preliminary approval.115 However, both
the plaintiffs and the NCAA have publicly stated that this settlement “does
not affect Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant National Collegiate Athletic
Association.” 116 The NCAA publicly announced that they would fight the
suits all the way to the United States Supreme Court if need be.117 On
appeal, the NCAA’s motion to dismiss the O’Bannon antitrust suit was
denied. 118 While this denial was expected, it inevitably guarantees many
years of continued litigation. 119 The District Court had also certified the

112. Id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 1289,
n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the equity behind the structure of NCAA
athletes is an issue, but believing that it is beyond the scope of appeal).
113. See id. at 1288, n. 4; Vladimir P. Belo, Note, The Shirts Off Their Backs: Colleges
Getting Away With Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 134
(1996) (“The universities have begun licensing products that seek to capitalize on the popularity
of actual players in addition to the popularity of the schools and their athletic teams.”); see
generally William D. Holthaus, Jr., Note, Ed O'Bannon v. NCAA: Do Former NCAA Athletes
Have A Case Against the NCAA for Its Use of Their Likenesses?, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 369
(2010); LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR. & MONO. §
22:32 (4th ed. 2012).
114. See generally Solomon, supra note 110.
115. See Steve Eder, E.A. Sports Settles Lawsuit with College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/sports/ncaafootball/ea-sports-wont-make-collegevideo-game-in-2014.html?_r=0; see generally Solomon, supra note 110.
116. Solomon, supra note 110.
117. Patrick Vint, O’Bannon vs. the NCAA: The EA Settlement Means TV Money is Now
the Battle, SB NATION (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:11 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/201
3/9/27/4775712/obannon-ncaa-ea-settlement-clc.
118. See Tom Farrey, NCAA Motion Denied in Player Suit, ESPN (Nov. 5, 2013, 6:01
PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9879455/judge-denies-motion-dismiss-ed-obannonncaa-lawsuit.
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O’Bannon lawsuit as a class-action, but with a significant catch: while
current and former NCAA athletes can challenge the NCAA restrictions on
athlete compensation, the class is certified for “purposes of injunctive relief
only,” meaning the student-athletes can legally “prevent the N.C.A.A. from
acting the same way in the future, but not for damages.” 120
The trial began on June 9, 2014, in District Court. 121 The trial
concluded on June 27, 2014, with each side submitting final written closing
statements to Judge Wilken by July 10, 2014. 122 On August 8, 2014, Judge
Wilken released a 99-page ruling in favor of the plaintiffs. 123 The ruling
issued an injunction that prohibits the NCAA from “enforcing any rules or
bylaws that would prohibit its member schools and conferences from
offering their FBS football or Division I basketball recruits a limited share
of the revenue generated from the use of their names, images, and
likenesses in addition to a full grant in aid.” 124
While the ruling theoretically could have enabled football and men’s
basketball programs to receive more aid from schools than they are
receiving now, possibly at the expense of other programs, the judge limited
the ruling by not allowing athletes to receive money for the endorsements
and saying, “[a]llowing student-athletes to endorse commercial products
would undermine the efforts of both the NCAA and its member schools to
protect against the ‘commercial exploitation’ of student-athletes.” 125 While
the injunction will not be stayed while under appeal, the earliest group it
119. See Hilary Russ, Athletes’ Licensing Fight Survives NCAA’s Bid to Toss, LAW360
(Feb. 8, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/148446/athletes-licensing-fightsurvives-ncaa-s-bid-to-toss.
120. Greg Bishop, N.C.A.A. Dodges a Bullet, But Change Is on the Way, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-dodges-abullet-but-change-is-on-the-way.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1387310021/ui8tQTiZJV7z2ddt8sBLw.
121. Stewart Mandel, Judge Allows Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA to Proceed to Trial, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (June 10, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-football/2014/02/20/ed-obannonlawsuit-proceeds-trial.
122. Steve Berkowitz, Closing Briefs Are In; O’Bannon Case in Hands of Judge, USA
TODAY (Jul. 11, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/07/10/edobannon-antitrust-case-against-ncaa-closing-judge-claudia-wilken/12510271/.
123. Berkowitz, supra note 110.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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will affect would be recruits entering school in 2016, as it will not take
effect until the start of the next Football Bowl Subdivision and Division I
basketball recruiting cycles. 126 The ruling also mandated that while the
NCAA will be able to cap the amount of compensation that Division I
football and men’s basketball players can receive while they are in school,
the cap will not be allowed to be an amount lower than the athlete’s cost of
attending school. 127 The ruling will also allow schools and conferences to
deposit money in trust for the athletes that will become payable when the
athletes leave an institution or their eligibility expires. 128
While the NCAA claims that it has to review the ruling, it is almost
certain to appeal the decision, as the ruling will potentially impact the
antitrust suit still before Judge Wilken,129 thus tying up the issue in court
for years. While this is a major step for college athletes because it did not
seem right that the players’ images were used and the athletes were not able
to be paid while their schools were making billions of dollars, 130 the ruling
also raises issues as to whether this is a sign that the college-athlete model
is set to crumble.
C. Breaking Down The Majority Opinion of the Anti-Slapp Motion:
Right Decision, Wrong Reasons
The Ninth Circuit correctly denied EA’s anti-SLAPP appeal and thus
opened the door for arguments that the NCAA and EA wrongly interfered
with the student-athlete’s right of publicity. 131 The Ninth Circuit in In re
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Other consequences of the ruling include the following: “The NCAA will be allowed
to set a cap on the amount of money that may be held in trust, but that cap cannot be less than
$5,000 in 2014 dollars for every year the athletes remain academically eligible. Schools will be
allowed to offer less than the NCAA maximum amount if they so choose, but they cannot
unlawfully conspire with each other in setting the amounts they offer. The NCAA will be
allowed have rules that prevent the athletes from using the money being held in trust for them to
obtain other financial benefits while they are in school. The NCAA also will be able to have rules
that prevent schools from offering different amounts of deferred money to athletes who are in the
same recruiting class on the same team. The amounts that schools decide to place in trust for the
athletes may vary from year to year.” Id.
129. Berkowitz, supra note 122.
130. Id.
131. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1269.
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NCAA Student-Athlete clearly recognized that the NCAA cannot
contractually restrict or entirely eliminate a person’s right of publicity, even
in the name of amateurism. 132 While the decision is morally sound, it
largely ignored the reality that the resulting confusion will upend the
purpose of amateurism.
The Court correctly rejected the First Amendment defenses that
would have given EA a blanket license to continue to profit off of the backs
of the athletes. 133 Although the direct question of the NCAA waivers was
not before the court, the failure to even address the waivers as they
currently stand, regardless of ripeness, appears to be a deliberate avoidance
of the issue. 134 While the court was deciding an appeal of a denial of an
anti-SLAPP motion, it still would have been an appropriate context to
address the broader issues since its holding may allow student-athletes to
bring claims in violation of the waivers. Thus, the court’s decision is
substantively deficient because it failed to consider the policy that its
decision could have on the NCAA waivers. 135 While the Ninth Circuit may
have believed that it was unnecessary to address the NCAA waivers and
amateurism, the decision exposed the shortsighted nature of the courtand
foreshadowed future lawsuits for the courts to decide, once and for all, the
true definition of amateurism. 136
Similarly, the pre-In re NCAA Student-Athlete holding in Hart v.
Electronic Arts, Inc. also indicates the judiciary’s overwhelming
willingness to recognize a limitation on First Amendment communication
defenses in the context of the right of publicity. 137 However, Hart failed to
consider the decision’s effect on amateurism and the NCAA waivers as a
consequence of its decision. 138 The case is almost factually identical to In
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1276; see also Timothy J. Bucher, Note, Game On: Sports-Related Games and
the Contentious Interplay Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment, 14 TEX. REV.
ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 4 (2012); cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
96 (1984) (the Court’s reasoning created greater confusion as to whether amateurism, as the
NCAA describes it, even exists anymore).
134. See generally In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d 1268.
135. See, e.g., Kendall K. Johnson, Note, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 42-48
(2012).
136. Id.
137. See Hart v. Elect. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013).
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re NCAA Student-Athlete; there, the Third Circuit reversed the district
court’s holding that First Amendment claims barred the former athlete’s
right of publicity assertion. 139 Former college athlete Ryan Hart sued EA
for misappropriating his image while he was the star quarterback at Rutgers
University in 2007. 140 While the district court initially found that Hart did
not state a viable right of publicity, the Third Circuit reversed and held that
he did have a viable right of publicity that was not barred by the First
Amendment. 141 However, although the majority in Hart explicitly
mentions that Hart was required to adhere to NCAA Bylaws while he was a
football player at Rutgers, it does not further mention the contractual
provisions. 142 Instead, similar to the Ninth Circuit, the Court analyzed the
case in the context of First Amendment defenses, which were identical to
the ones raised during the subsequent Ninth Circuit decision.143
It is clear that the First Amendment is a significant factor when
scrutinizing sports-related videogames in the contentious context of right of
publicity; however, merely sidestepping the issue only intensifies the
inevitability that even more suits will be brought. 144 Again, this
demonstrates that both the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit were
reluctant to consider how their decisions undermine the purpose of even
recognizing a right of publicity for student-athletes because they did not
consider the effect on college athletes as a whole.145
138. See generally id.
139. Id. at 145; see also Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding that while there was a right to publicity, First Amendment defenses
generally trump that right in the absence of more compelling reasons).
140. Hart, 717 F.3d at 145.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing NCAA, 2011–12 NCAA Division I Manual §§ 12.01.1; 12.1.2; 12.5.21
(2011) (“Only an amateur student-athlete is eligible for inter-collegiate athletics participation in a
particular sport. In relevant part, these rules state that a collegiate athlete loses his or her
‘amateur’ status if (1) the athlete ‘[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in
any form in that sport,’ or (2) the athlete ‘[a]ccepts any remuneration or permits the use of his or
her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial
product or service of any kind.’).
144. Bucher, supra note 133, at 23.
145. See generally Maureen C. Weston, The Fantasy of Athlete Publicity Rights: Public
Fascination and Fantasy Sports' Assertion of Free Use Place Athlete Publicity Rights on an
Uncertain Playing Field, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 581 (2008).
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D. The Dissent Misses The Point By Failing to Adequately Address
the Significance of the NCAA Waivers in Light of the Majority’s Holding
Unlike the majority, the dissent in In re NCAA Student-Athlete
recognized the significance of the NCAA waivers. 146 The dissent stated
that even if student-athletes have a right of publicity, their rights are
incredibly restricted because they are banned from receiving compensation
and because they contractually surrendered their rights of publicity to the
NCAA. 147 In fact, the dissent emphasized that the NCAA waivers should
have been critical to the majority’s holding because the NCAA waivers
eradicate student-athletes’ economic rights, which, the dissent argues, is the
key to even having a right of publicity. 148 However, the dissent mistakenly
stated that the majority erroneously equated the right of publicity of
student-athletes with that of professional athletes.149 Not only did the
dissent not provide any empirical data to prove that student-athletes do not
have valuable images, but it also ignored the fact that EA Sports has made
millions off its NCAA Football and NCAA Basketball series. 150
The dissent essentially believed that the NCAA waivers render the
individual college athlete’s right of publicity practically nonexistent, and
that the structure itself provides a significant backdrop to whether the right
should be recognized. 151 However, the dissent similarly avoided directly
addressing the issue by stating “[t]he issue . . . is beyond the scope of this
appeal,” and failed to consider that once the right of publicity is
recognized, it undermines the NCAA rules and triggers a complete
restructure. 152 Moreover, the dissent did not consider that signing the

146. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d 1268, 1289 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 415 (2001)
(“The right to exploit commercially one’s celebrity is primarily an economic right.”).
149. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1286 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150. See Chris Smith, NCAA Football Video Game Is Worth Over $75,000 Per Year for
Top Teams, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/
08/22/ncaa-football-video-game-is-worth-over-75000-per-year-for-top-teams/.
151. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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NCAA waivers alone does not mean the agreements are enforceable.153
IV. THE APPLICATION OF UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE
TO THE NCAA WAIVERS
This section will argue that student-athletes can attack the NCAA
waivers under the contractual doctrine of unconscionability in light of the
In re NCAA Student-Athlete holding.
A. The Unconscionability Doctrine
One burning question is whether the Ninth Circuit’s holding has
rendered NCAA Bylaws 12.5.1 and 12.5.2 unenforceable. 154 Many critics
have contended that the NCAA waivers are unconscionable because the
terms of the contracts unreasonably favor the NCAA. 155 Well-known
athletes who enter college with a clear right of publicity usually receive the
strongest support for NCAA waivers being unconscionable. 156 In re NCAA
Student-Athlete opens the door for the argument that the NCAA waivers are
unconscionable.
Unconscionability is a doctrine of contract law that describes terms
that are so extremely unjust, or overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of the
party who has the superior bargaining power that the party does not
contract in good conscience. 157 Unconscionability is generally defined as
an “absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other

153. See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can
Learn From Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006).
154. See Christian Dennie, Amateurism Stifles A Student-Athlete's Dream, 12 SPORTS
LAW. J. 221, 234-37 (2005) (citing Interview with Aaron Adair, Former Student-Athlete,
University of Oklahoma, in Norman, Okla. (Oct. 26, 2003)).
155. See Kristine Mueller, Note, No Control Over Their Rights of Publicity: College
Athletes Left Sitting the Bench, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 70, 70-71 (2004);
Kendall K. Johnson, Note, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of Publicity,
Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 48 (2012).
156. Mueller, supra note 155 at 70-71.
157. See, e.g., John Edward Murray, Jr., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 30, at 61-64 (4th ed.
2001); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACTS § 4.287, at 307-08 (3d ed. 1999); see generally
Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66
LA. L. REV. 123 (2005).
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parties.” 158 Typically, an unconscionable contract is deemed unenforceable
because no reasonable or informed person would otherwise agree to it. 159
Courts determine unconscionability by examining the circumstances
of the parties when the contract was made, such as their bargaining power,
age, and mental capacity. 160 Other issues potentially include lack of
choice, superior knowledge, and other obligations or circumstances
surrounding the bargaining process. 161 Additionally, “unconscionably”
taking advantage of another party can render a contract unenforceable in a
civil action.162 In order to successfully establish unconscionability, the
issue is whether the contract was unconscionable at the time it was made;
therefore, subsequent circumstances that make the contract extremely onesided are considered irrelevant. 163 Unconscionability is a factual analysis
decided by a judge, and only applied when it would be a serious affront to
the integrity of the judicial system to enforce such a contract.164 In some
instances, a judge only may render the offending clause unenforceable
while upholding other aspects of the contract in order to bring about a fair
outcome. 165
In addition to unconscionability, to invalidate a contract or contractual
clause on the basis of unconscionability, most courts require a showing of
Procedural
both procedural and substantive unconscionability. 166

158. Farnsworth, supra note 157 at 311 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
163. See id. at 450. Compare Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629-31 (1943) (discussing that freedom of
contract relates to society’s free enterprise system), with E. Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACTS § 1.7,
at 20-21 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that the decline of the free enterprise system in the 20th century
has led to a shift away from the historical emphasis on freedom of contract).
164. See Farnsworth supra note 157; see Williams, 350 F.2d at 449.
165. See Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 847 (Ct. App. 1991).
166. See, e.g., Svalina v. Split Rock Land & Cattle Co., 816 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1991)
(listing six factors used to determine procedural unconscionability, including whenever “one
party [was] in some manner surprised by fine print or concealed terms”); see Farnsworth supra
note 158.; see also Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (noting that terms can be procedurally
unconscionable if they are “hidden in a maze of fine print”).
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unconscionability focuses on identifying flaws in the contract that made the
agreement either unfairly surprising or coercive; 167 substantive
unconscionability focuses on defects in the bargaining process by
identifying grossly one-sided terms. 168 Generally, if there is more of one
type of unconscionability present, less evidence of the other is required.169
Thus, unconscionability is reserved for the most extreme cases, and
unfortunately, most contractual challenges based on unconscionability
fail. 170 A mere imbalance of consideration between the parties is not
enough to establish that a contract is unconscionable.171 Clearly, in order
for the student-athletes to establish unconscionability, it is not enough to
demonstrate disparity in size and bargaining power, or that the deal is
unfair; student-athletes must show that the contract is so grossly one-sided
and procedurally flawed that it “shock[s] the conscience.” 172 Ultimately,
however, student-athletes will be able to establish unconscionability as to
the NCAA waivers. 173
167. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (Ct. App.
1989).
168. Id.
169. Id. (“A relatively larger degree of one will compensate for a relatively smaller
degree of the other.”); see, e.g., Carboni, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 (noting the sliding scale
relationship between the two concepts).
170. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1442 (2008) (“[I]t is well
known that unconscionability is generally a loser of an argument.”); see also Danielle Kie
Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 215 n.219
(2009) (“[E]mpirical studies indicate that challenges based on contract policing doctrines, like
duress and unconscionability, usually fail.”).
171. Even in cases where the result was extremely harsh, contracts have been enforced.
See, e.g., Drake v. W. Va. Self-Storage, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 21, 26 (W. Va. 1998) (holding that a
contract entitled the defendant to sell plaintiff's possessions worth more than $10,000 for $150
when she failed to make $40 rental payments on a storage unit); Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549
P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1976) (“The UCC does not require that there be complete equality of
bargaining power or that the agreement be equally beneficial to both parties”) (citations omitted);
M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 766 (1969) (“[M]ere
disparity of bargaining strength, without more, is not enough to make out a case of
unconscionability.”).
172. See Johnson, supra note 155, at 18 (quoting Osgood v. Franklin, 1 N.Y. Ch. Ann.
275 (1816) (stating that unconscionability requires that an agreement ”shock the conscience and
confound the judgment of any man of common sense.”)) (citing Cal. Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of
Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Ct. App. 1994)).
173. See generally id.
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B. Student-Athletes Are Unfairly Surprised
by the Terms of the Student-Athlete Waivers
Unfair surprise is a key part of establishing procedural
unconscionability. 174 This occurs when one party is either unable to
comprehend the terms of the agreement, or is unaware that the terms
existed in the first place. 175 Some examples of unfair surprise include when
a party is uneducated, illiterate, unable to comprehend the language of the
agreement, or is limited in understanding by infancy or mental
incapacity. 176 Unfair surprise also occurs when a term is buried in small
print, found in an unexpected location, or couched in intentionally
confusing language. 177 However, this is not an exhaustive list. 178
Moreover, all parties are charged with a duty to read the terms of a
contract—parties who simply failed to read the agreement cannot claim
unfair surprise. 179
The NCAA process takes advantage of young and inexperienced
student-athletes who truly do not comprehend the magnitude of the contract
174. See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1296 (9th Cir. 2006).
175. See Sanchez v. W. Pizza Enter., 172 Cal. App. 4th 154, 173 (2009) (“Unfair surprise
results from misleading bargaining conduct or other circumstances indicating that a party’s
consent was not an informed choice.”).
176. Jackson v. Bank of Am. Corp., 711 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Amoco Oil
Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that “mental incapacity that prevents
a party from ‘appreciating the significance of the agreement’” is enough for unfair surprise under
unconscionability)); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1976)
(holding that illiteracy was sufficient to find unfair surprise); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664
P.2d 455, 462 (Utah 1983) (citing Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1976))
(explaining that unfair surprise can be shown when parties are “underprivileged, unsophisticated,
uneducated and illiterate.”)); Lovey v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 877, 882 (Idaho
2003) (indicating that unfair surprise can be demonstrated through “lack of understanding
regarding the contract terms arising from the use of inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or
complex legalistic language; the lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about its
terms; or disparity in sophistication, knowledge, or experience of the parties.”).
177. Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 948 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Idaho 1997); see Lovey, 72
P.3d at 882.
178. See generally Lovey, 72 P.3d 877 (unfair surprise can include convoluted language
and fine print).
179. Stanley A. Kopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
(“[A] person has a duty to read a contract before signing it and his failure to do so will not excuse
his ignorance of its contents.”).
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that they are signing. 180 Student-athletes, some of whom are not even
eighteen-years-old at the time of contracting, are signing a contract that has
been drafted by a party that is substantially more sophisticated and far more
knowledgeable about the contract and its implications than the studentathletes. 181
Few student-athletes, if any, consult an attorney first and are
precluded from hiring an agent since that would violate the NCAA
Bylaws. 182 Yet, it is puzzling that supporters of the NCAA process contend
that these factors are not enough to find the NCAA process procedurally
unconscionable, considering that many courts applying this rule to
arbitration agreements have found procedurally unconscionable those that
involve parties of unequal size, sophistication, and bargaining power. 183
While it is true that courts have found that disparity in size alone is not
enough to render a contract unconscionable, disparity taken with other
factors tends to support unconscionability. 184 Furthermore, while the
NCAA undoubtedly has the power to take steps to ensure the studentathletes understand the terms and that the clauses are conspicuous, there is
no evidence that the NCAA actually takes steps such as explaining some of
the terms, putting key terms in bold type, and using contrasting colors or
capital letters. 185

180. Preston Peeden, NCAA Corrupt, Takes Advantage of Players, THE DAILY BEACON
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://utdailybeacon.com/sports/2013/apr/25/ncaa-corrupt-takes-advantageplayers/.
181. See Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest AntiTrust Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 21, 2009), http://www.si.com/moresports/2009/07/21/ncaa (noting that “the lack of ‘life experience’ of most incoming studentathletes” makes the process “exploitive and also one that creates a disparity in bargaining
power”).
182. See, e.g., The Truth Behind the National Letter of Intent, NEON TOMMY (Apr. 29,
2010, 12:19 AM), http://www.neontommy.com/2010/04/national-letter-of-intent.
183. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (citing
several California Supreme Court cases in which California courts have applied this rule of
unconscionability to invalidate arbitration agreements or portions thereof on grounds of
unconscionability). Any meaningful distinctions that may exist between arbitration agreements
and contracts are not important in this context, for the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes that
arbitration agreements stand on “equal footing” with contracts. Id. (citing Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
184. See id. at 1746.
185. Johnson, supra note 155, at 20-21 (supporting the notion that the use of the given
methods makes a contract more enforceable as a consequence of the clauses being more
conspicuous) (citations omitted); see Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 124 (Ill. App. Ct.
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Supporters of the NCAA waivers also fail to demonstrate that studentathletes actually comprehend the terms. 186 In fact, one supporter merely
concludes that “in all but the rarest cases, a student-athlete is fully aware of
the relevant terms of the agreement.” 187 While some comprehension
arguably can be presumed based on the general education presumptions
since prospective student-athletes must be high school seniors, this
presumption is not enough to make a blanket-sweeping statement that
“student-athlete[s] [are] fully aware of the relevant terms.” 188
Although the NCAA Student-Athlete Statement is a mere seven pages
long with seven short separate clauses, 189 such brevity is not dispositive in
and of itself to establish that all or even most student-athletes understand its
terms. This is especially true since the actual NCAA Student-Athlete
Manual that the contract internally references is almost 500 pages.190
Furthermore, while the fact that each clause “requires an individual
signature” could imply that the student-athlete has acknowledged the clause
in question, 191 the mere act of signing each clause does not on its own mean
that the athlete has been made fully aware of the magnitude of the terms.
Finally, the fact that the contract was “written in comparatively plain
English” is arguably still fairly subjective considering that many studentathletes come from ethnically diverse or limited educational backgrounds
or lower socioeconomic statuses; practically speaking, their versions of
“plain English” will differ greatly from those understood by legal
scholars. 192
While NCAA-member schools do employ a compliance staff who are
2005) (identifying methods a contracting party can employ that a court may look to for purposes
of rendering a clause conspicuous).
186. Id. at 21, n.143 (2012) (referencing Stanford Univ. Dept. of Athletics, 2010-11
Student-Athlete Handbook 5, 32 (2010)) (noting that Stanford University’s compliance personnel
attempts to help student-athletes understand these terms). Note that attempting to help a studentathlete understand a contract’s terms does not guarantee that the student-athlete will ultimately
understand its terms.
187. Id. at 21.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 20.
191. Johnson, supra note 155, at 21.
192. Id.
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supposed to be available to explain the NCAA regulations and meet with
student-athletes on an annual basis, 193 mere availability is not enough to
show that the staff actually met with or explained the terms to the studentathletes. Even so, the compliance staff is primarily there to protect the
NCAA and member schools’ interests. 194 Moreover, the compliance staff
is only available after the student-athlete becomes an enrolled student and
is not a part of the initial contracting, which arguably is the heart of the
unconscionability claim. Thus, the compliance staff has no incentive to
explain the NCAA rules to prospective student-athletes. Although the
Student-Athlete statement “explicitly refers student-athletes to a school’s
compliance staff and athletic director to explain the terms . . . [and
provides] a phone number for the NCAA where additional questions can be
answered,” 195 the statement fails to demonstrate whether, if at all, studentathletes fully realize that the school has sole right to profit from and use the
student-athletes’ images.
Although the NCAA process arguably mandates parental involvement
because parental signatures are required on three of the main contractual
documents for all student-athletes, this is only required for student-athletes
who are minors. 196 While parents arguably have the best intentions for
their children, it is unclear whether they truly understand the magnitude of
what they are signing on behalf of their children.
Finally, supporters of the NCAA waivers fail to demonstrate that
student-athletes are capable of fully assenting to a contract simply because
they have been admitted to college.197 Mere admission to college is not
enough to state that the student-athletes can comprehend legal agreements,
especially since many were admitted only on the basis of their athletic
ability and had poor academic performance. 198 It is also untrue that

193. See, e.g., id.
194. William C. Rhoden, University Compliance Officers: Good Cop, Bad Cop, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/sports/ncaabasketball/11rhoden.htm
l?_r=0.
195. Johnson, supra note 155, at 21.
196. See, e.g., Drug-Testing Consent Form – NCAA Division III, NCAA, http://www.nca
a.org/sites/default/files/DIII%20Form%2014-3f%20-%20Drug%20Testing%20 Consent_0.pdf
(last visited Oct. 24, 2014).
197. Johnson, supra note 155, at 22.
198. See Allie Grasgreen, A Rules Rebuke, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 3, 2013),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/05/03/ncaa-backtracks-recruiting-academic-rules; see
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student-athletes must show a mastery of reading comprehension on the
SAT. 199 While student-athletes must receive a satisfactory score,200 this
basically means that student-athletes cannot completely fail the exam.
Thus, based on this low standard, it is difficult to determine whether
student-athletes are in the top of their class academically. 201 While it is
true that age alone is not enough to render a contract unconscionable,202
especially for student-athletes who are underage when they sign, it is a
factor that, combined with others, can lean towards unconscionability. 203
Even so, supporters of the waivers failed to demonstrate that the
NCAA process as a whole is sufficient to make the contract procedurally
conscionable. 204 Supporters attempt to point to the fact that “[y]oung
people in the United States make decisions with far greater implications
than the decision to allow an NCAA institution to use their publicity
rights,” by stating 18-year-olds are eligible to serve life imprisonment. 205
This analogy is severely misplaced because likening life imprisonment to
the NCAA contracts is simply not comparable because, arguably, life
imprisonment is not a meaningful contract with the corrections department.
Ultimately, there are factors present that would help the studentathletes challenge the waivers as unconscionable, especially in light of In
re NCAA Student Athlete. 206 In fact, in In re NCAA Student-Athlete, the
court held that, contrary to the NCAA waivers, student-athletes do have a
also Sara Ganim, CNN Analysis: Some College Athletes Play Like Adults, Read Like 5th-Graders,
CNN (Jan. 8, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/us/ncaa-athletes-reading-scores/.
199. See Grasgreen, supra note 198; see also Ganim, supra note 198.
200. See Ganim, supra note 198; see also Sam Weyrauch, Banded Together: Recruited
Athletes with Sub-Average Academics Can Receive Preference in Admissions, THE BOWDOIN
ORIENT (Mar. 28, 2014), http://bowdoinorient.com/article/9151; see generally Paula Lavigne,
Bad Grades? Some Schools Ok With It, ESPN (Oct. 18, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn
/otl/story/_/page/Outside-The-Lines-GPA/some-high-schools-actually-reducing-gparequirements-student-athletes.
201. See Grasgreen, supra note 198; see also Ganim, supra note 198.
202. Johnson, supra note 155, at 22.
203. See Thi of Georgia at Shamrock, LLC v. Fields, No. CV 313-032, 2013 WL
6097569, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2013).
204. Contra Johnson, supra note 155, at 23.
205. Contra id.
206. See generally In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724
F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
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right of publicity that is not contractually eliminated. 207 Thus, the NCAA
student-athlete waivers are likely procedurally unconscionable because the
Ninth Circuit’s holding opens the door for student-athletes to attack this
offensive clause.
C. Student-Athletes Do Not Have a Meaningful Choice
to Not Contract with the NCAA Because
Their Playing Choices Are Extremely Limited
Supporters of the NCAA process claim that the most compelling
theory that cuts against procedural unconscionability is that student-athletes
have the option of either foregoing the NCAA contract altogether or to
contract with a party outside of the NCAA. 208 However, just because these
options are available does not mean that the student-athletes still have a
meaningful choice. 209
The NCAA is an organization that clearly provides student-athletes
with an unmatched opportunity to compete at an elite level while pursuing
a college degree. 210 The NCAA offers its contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis and do not allow any negotiation with the student-athletes. 211 Thus,
the NCAA waivers are adhesion contracts, meaning that the student-athlete
has no meaningful choice but to sign if they want to compete at an elite
level in college sports. 212 While it is true that adhesion alone is not per se
unconscionable, it is one of many factors leaning in favor of finding
unconscionability. 213 Although adhesion contracts are prevalent, and most
are enforceable, the real issue here is whether the student-athletes can
reasonably reject it without giving up an opportunity to be noticed on a
heightened level that is more likely to lead to professional playing
207. Id. at 1269.
208. See Johnson, supra note 155, at 25-26.
209. See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 449–50.
210. Jason Belzer, Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes or Employee-Athletes?,
FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2013/09/09/levelingthe-playing-field-student-athletes-or-employee-athletes/.
211. See The Value of College Sports, NCAA (Sept. 26, 2014; 4:42 PM), http://www.ncaa
.org/student-athletes/value-college-sports.
212. See Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 807 (Ct. App. 2005).
213. Id.
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opportunities. 214
Courts have found lack of meaningful choice when there is only one
provider of a certain product or service and in those situations, the weaker
party must accept the terms of the service or forego the product or service
altogether because the provider is unwilling to negotiate the terms. 215 This
clearly epitomizes the NCAA; no organization rivals the NCAA when it
comes to size and prestige of the organization, as well as the opportunity to
have collegiate scholarships and the opportunity to simultaneously engage
in athletics and academics at a superior level.216 Even though Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) does allow high school students to be drafted directly
out of high school, 217 this is still incomparable because only the top high
school prospects have realistic chances of being drafted. It is also
undisputed that the NCAA is not only a key step on the path to becoming a
professional athlete, it also provides the student-athletes with the most
prominent national stage for professional scouts and recruiters.218
Supporters of the NCAA process claim that “just because the NCAA
may be the best provider of athletic opportunities does not mean that the
NCAA is the only provider of such opportunities,” and this heavily weighs
against finding unconscionability. 219 While courts have found that
dominance of a certain provider does not make that seller a monopolist, the
unconscionability analysis does not stop there,220 and while the “coercive
power of a monopolistic seller” is arguably alleviated when providers offer
the weaker party the option to go elsewhere,221 the alternative choice here
(outside the NCAA) is simply incomparable in the field of amateur
athletics.
Although there are many cases where no unconscionability was found
because plaintiffs had an alternative choice in choosing a good or service,
214. Johnson, supra note 155, at 25.
215. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981).
216. Johnson, supra note 155, at 25.
217. First Year Player Draft Rules, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/draftday/rules.jsp (last
visited Oct. 24, 2014).
218. Johnson, supra note 155, at 25.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 26.
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the majority of those cases are incomparable. For instance, the sale of
advertisements exclusively should be distinguishable from having to give
up one’s image rights in order to participate in high level sports. The court
in Discount Fabric House of Racine v. Wisconsin Telephone Company held
that a contract specifically limiting liability for errors in advertising was
unconscionable.
There, the telephone directory containing the
advertisements was an “indispensable element of telephone service” due to
the company’s commercial efforts and there were no equal competitive
methods for advertisement.222 It is worth noting that there is a
jurisdictional split concerning whether the meaningful alternative choice
should at least be comparable, rather than just an alternative.223
In the amateur athletics context, there are no realistic meaningful
alternatives. While it is true that student-athletes may participate in the
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) or the National
Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA), these are not only
significantly limited options, but clearly few professional sports teams, if
any, scout for student-athletes from that arena.224 Moreover, while the best
young basketball players can play professionally in the National Basketball
Association (NBA), National Summer League (NSL), or National
Development League (NDL), once they turn nineteen or have completed
one year of college, that field is primarily comprised of bench players, and
not as easy to break into as the NCAA. 225 Of course, while student-athletes
222. See Disc. Fabric House of Racine v. Wis. Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 425-26 (Wis.
1984).
223. Compare Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 171 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Mich. 1969), with
Louisville Bear Safety Serv. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 571 S.W.2d 438, 439-40 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978).
224. Colleges, NJCAA (Aug. 19, 2014, 2:08 PM), http://www.njcaa.org/colleges.cfm;
Guide NAIA: Guide For College-Bound Student-Athlete, NAIA, 2, http://www.naia.org/fls/2790
0/1NAIA/membership/NAIA_GuidefortheCollegeBoundStudent.pdf?DB_OEM_ID=27900 (last
visited Oct. 24, 2014) (the NAIA has nearly 300 member institutions with around $450 million
dollars in financial aid each year); NAIA College Athletes and Athletic Scholarships, NAIA (Aug.
18, 2014, 2:50PM), http://www.athleticscholarships.net/naiainformation.htm (last visited Oct. 24,
2014); see Information for a Prospective NJCAA Student-Athlete, NJCAA, 1, http://www.njcaa.o
rg/njcaaforms/140605_2_Prospective%20student%20brochure%2014-15.pdf (last visited Oct. 24,
2014) (the NJCAA has 513 member institutions and also provides athletic aid to student-athletes).
However, these facts alone do not demonstrate how many players make the leap from the NAIA
to either the NBA, NFL or WNBA, in contrast to the NCAA.
225. See Player Eligibility and NBA Draft, NBA PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, 1-2,
http://www.nbpa.com/sites/nbpa.org/files/ARTICLE%20X.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). Note
that a 2005 change to NBA Draft rules limited the number of high school seniors who are eligible
to be selected, but some, such as John Wall, may be eligible to make the leap from high school to
the NBA.
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can play semi-professionally for the American Basketball Association, the
World Basketball League, or the International Basketball League, those are
still developmental leagues that are restricted to the very top players that
are not the typical student-athlete coming into their own during college. 226
There is also no real meaningful choice to participate in amateur
football outside of the NCAA. While budding football players may
participate in arena football, this is not an amateur sport because these
players receive compensation. 227 In fact, in the case of Terrell Owens, it
was more of a career-ending move to play arena football in an attempt to
get back into the National Football League (NFL).228 While supporters
claim there are potential opportunities to play American-style football
abroad, it ignores the lack of realistic opportunities that would develop
from those options. 229 Moreover, there are no true statistics of how many
student-athletes who play in these alternative leagues garner recognition in
the NBA or NFL drafts that translates into professional play. 230
While supporters concede that “these options are not perfectly
comparable to the experience that the NCAA provides and do not afford
identical benefits,” they also fail to demonstrate how the mere possibility of
participating, however attenuated, in a less stellar field may equate to
coming out with the same skills.231 Hence, while student-athletes arguably
have a mere “choice to take their athletic skills elsewhere,” the reality is
that if they wish to play at a high level and transition into professional
sports, the only real option appears to be the NCAA. 232

226. See Johnson, supra note 155, at 27.
227. See Zac Boyer, In Arena League, Dreams of Following Jay Gruden’s Path, WASH.
TIMES (July 22, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/22/arena-footballleague-dreams-following-jay-grudens/?page=all.
228. See Tim MacMahon, IFL Team Releases Terrell Owens, ESPN (May 30, 2012, 1:51
PM), http://espn.go.com/dallas/nfl/story/_/id/7984924/terrell-owens-cut-indoor-football-teamloses-ownership-share.
229. See generally Johnson, supra, note 155.
230. There are no statistics currently available concerning the amount or percentage of
players who transition from alternative leagues into the NFL or NBA.
231. Johnson, supra note 155, at 28.
232. Id.
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D. The NCAA Contracts Are Substantively
Unconscionable and Unfair
The fact that the contract terms unreasonably favor the NCAA
strongly suggests that they are substantively unconscionable. 233 Not only
do the contract terms unreasonably favor the NCAA, but the potential
scholarship benefits, if available, pale in comparison to the NCAA’s
substantial merchandise licensing revenue and the multibillion-dollar
television contracts.234 In fact, one supporter of the NCAA process even
states “it is estimated that Patrick Ewing generated $12 million in revenue
for Georgetown University during his four years at school in the early
1980s, far more than the value of his athletic scholarship.” 235 Clearly
NCAA revenue primarily comes from licensing student-athlete images for
use in television broadcasts and merchandising. 236 Thus, student-athlete
images undoubtedly generate a substantial portion of the revenue for the
NCAA and its member schools. 237
Student-athletes are also barred from receiving monetary
compensation for their services while they are in school and, once they
graduate, do not receive any royalties from NCAA products that continue
to be sold using their likenesses. 238 Former student-athlete and In re NCAA
Student-Athlete plaintiff Oscar Robertson claimed that the NCAA has
continued to profit off his image by selling “Greats of the Game” trading
cards, cut-up pieces of his uniform, photographs from his playing days, and
233. See Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2009).
234. See Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, and the StudentAthlete, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 107, 108-09 (2012); see also Robert A. McCormick & Amy
Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81
WASH. L. REV. 71, 131 (2006); C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now,
More than Ever, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1997).
235. Paul C. Weiler & Gary R. Roberts, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES,
PROBLEMS, 647-48 (2d ed. 1998).
236. See Karcher, supra note 234, at 108-09; see also McCormick &McCormick, supra
note 234, at 131; Goplerud III, supra note 234, at 1082.
237. See, e.g., Gregory Sconzo, Note, They're Not Yours, They Are My Own: How NCAA
Employment Restrictions Violate Antitrust Law, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737, 739 (2012); Laura
Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 13
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 682-83 (2003) (citing Mark Brown, Autry Sues
NCAA over Film Role, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, available at 1996 WLNR 6428419).
238. Johnson, supra note 155, at 32; see also In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at
1289 (Thomas J., dissenting).
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video footage from his college games and has never compensated him. 239
Fellow plaintiff Tate George claimed that a clip of his game-winning shot
during the 1990 NCAA Tournament, which ESPN has ranked one of the
top five NCAA shots of all time, has been included in commercials for
Vitamin Water, McDonald’s, Burger King, Buick, Chrysler, and
Cadillac. 240 George has also never received any compensation. 241 Finally,
plaintiff Samuel Keller has focused on the use of his image in video games
such as the “NCAA Football” series produced by EA, in which the Ninth
Circuit ultimately held for Keller. 242 Other plaintiffs have pointed to the
NCAA’s profits from DVD sales, premium content on Web sites, jerseys
and other apparel, posters, and rebroadcasts of classic games where their
images were used. 243 The value that the NCAA reaps by taking the
publicity rights of student-athletes is grossly disproportionate to the
scholarship benefits the student-athletes receive in exchange.244 Thus,
these fantastical figures lean in favor of finding that the NCAA contracts
meet the legal definition of substantive unconscionability. 245
It is true that the unconscionability analysis must be taken as a whole
and must be so grossly unfair to one party that the agreement as a whole
“shock[s] the conscience.” 246 Supporters of the NCAA provisions argue
that student-athletes “receive the better end of the deal” in the form of
scholarships, training and other benefits.247 Arguably, while studentathletes do receive extremely valuable benefits in the form of scholarships,
these benefits pale in comparison to the licensing revenues generated.
Moreover, although NCAA schools provide benefits like travel, hotel stays
and meals, to its student-athletes, these opportunities are also available to

239. Johnson, supra note 155, at 32.
240. Class Action Complaint, Robertson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 11
0388, 2011 WL 240797, at *29-34 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011).
241. Id. at *29-34.
242. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1283-84.
243. Robertson, No. CV 11 0388, 2011 WL 240797, at *16, 17, 27, 28, 36-38.
244. Johnson, supra note 155, at 6.
245. See Cordova, 208 P.3d at 901, 907-08.
246. Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 1996).
247. Johnson, supra note 155, at 33.
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other non-athletic teams such as debate clubs.248 Moreover, while studentathletes arguably receive access to the best athletic facilities, some of those
facilities are also open to non-NCAA students for use on non-game or
practice days. 249
The most important benefit from playing in the NCAA that studentathletes receive is publicity from playing at such a high level. Supporters
may argue that the publicity benefit received is attributed to the NCAAfunded public relations program to “promote [student-athletes’]
accomplishments,” as well as the fact that many formerly unknown players
“rise to stardom as a result of the NCAA-managed publicity.” 250 However,
this still ignores the fact that the NCAA is the only such stage where a
student-athlete can receive that high caliber of publicity, since, as
previously discussed, there is almost no comparable opportunity in other
such arenas. 251
While supporters of the NCAA process may try to qualify the NCAA
right to use the images as “limited” and “nonexclusive,” it downplays the
very fact that it is truly exclusive because the players themselves cannot
benefit from the use of their own images. 252 While the NCAA only has the
right to use the player’s image as an NCAA athlete, and not his image as a
whole, the student-athletes are solely challenging the use of their images
from athletic participation, and not from other contexts.253 Hence, while
supporters of the NCAA process claim that student-athlete images are
effectively worth nothing on the market, the very fact that these images and
names help sell NCAA merchandise demonstrate the value of the
images. 254

248. See Financial Operations, Special Travel Situations, THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM
AND MARY, http://www.wm.edu/offices/financialoperations/travel/specialsituations/index.php
(last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (providing a breakdown of travel reimbursements for students who
compete on debate or club teams).
249. See Fitness, Facilities & Hours, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
http://athletics.uchicago.edu/facilities/index (last visited Oct. 24, 2014) (outlining fitness hours
for non-NCAA students).
250. Johnson, supra note 155, at 34.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas J., dissenting).
254. See Editorial: O’Bannon v. NCAA: How Much are Athletes Worth?, PITT NEWS
(June 10, 2014, 11:31 PM), http://www.pittnews.com/opinion/article_83ee9770-f118-11e3-a29e-
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It is true that while courts “are not in the business of evaluating the
fairness of contracts and attempting to achieve absolute equity,” they still
must ensure that there is some fairness in the process.255 Although the
freedom of contract does allow parties to agree to terms that are blatantly
imbalanced, the purpose of that prong rides on the freedom aspect, which is
undoubtedly vitiated when there is no real meaningful choice to go outside
the NCAA. 256 Courts look for terms that provide one party with no real
opportunity to benefit or terms that “no man in his senses and not under
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would
accept on the other.” 257 Thus, especially in extreme cases, addressed in
more detail below, the NCAA comes out on the better end of the deal, and
often comes out so far ahead that the deal can be purported to “shock the
conscience.”
E. Well-Known Student-Athletes with Extremely Valuable Images
Epitomize the Unconscionability of NCAA Waivers
It is undisputed that some student-athletes do come out of high school
with an image that is practically guaranteed to be profitable.258 For
instance, former Texas A&M quarterback Johnny Manziel was highly
recruited out of high school and received publicity for his football prowess
since his sophomore year of high school.259 “Others have received enough
attention prior to college to have concrete marketing opportunities.” 260
When these student-athletes sign a contract giving away rights worth
millions of dollars in exchange for a scholarship, the benefits of the

0017a43b2370.html; see generally McCormick & McCormick, supra note 235; Goplerud III,
supra note 235.
255. Johnson, supra note 155, at 35.
256. See Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 800 A.2d 915, 920 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
2002).
257. See Tulowitzki v. Atl. Richfield Co., 396 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1978).
258. See generally David Berri, One More Reason to Pay College Athletes, TIME (Aug.
17, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/08/17/one-more-reason-to-pay-college-athletes/.
259. College Football Player Bio for Johnny Manziel, TEXAS A&M,
http://www.aggieathletics.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=27300&ATCLID=205236136
(last visited Oct 24, 2014).
260. Johnson, supra note 155, at 43.
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contract are disparate enough to “shock the conscience,” and as such,
unenforceable.261
“While a mediocre basketball player’s non-NCAA alternatives may
be limited to recreational or semi-pro leagues, a high-profile player likely
has his choice of any professional league in the world.” 262 Pursuant to
NBA rules, a player must be one year removed from high school to be
eligible to play in the NBA, regardless of whether he plays NCAA sports or
not. 263 Moreover, as previously mentioned, the mere potential of an option
alone does not necessarily render it a meaningful choice if it is not
comparable. 264 Thus, the mere possibility of options is insufficient to pass
substantial conscionability because the student-athlete does not have a
meaningful choice to reject the terms. 265
“Second, the substantive value of a student-athlete’s image” makes it
easier to establish substantive unconscionability. 266 While a well-known
student-athlete with a valuable image can receive immense consideration in
return for the use of his image at a higher level than the average athlete
because of the professional opportunities the NCAA experience makes
available, this consideration does not justify depriving the student-athlete
of his right of publicity. 267
Although for most student-athletes, the access to world-class coaches
and promotion from awards and honors have experiential value, these
benefits do not negate the fact that the NCAA is receiving millions of
dollars that may outweigh the experiential value. 268 “For the average
softball player, swimmer, or fencer – no matter how talented – the
experience ends upon graduation and has no cash value.” 269 Yet “ for a
high-profile athlete, particularly a men’s basketball player or football
261. Contra id. at 48.
262. See id. at 43.
263. See Player Eligibility and NBA Draft, supra note 225.
264. See Disc. Fabric House of Racine, 345 N.W.2d at 424.
265. See id.
266. Contra Johnson, supra note 155, at 44.
267. Contra id.
268. Contra id.
269. See id.
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player, the training and exposure he receives in college”270 suggests a
strongly likelihood of success that both the NCAA and schools are aware
of at the time of recruitment.271 “Success in the NCAA can earn a player
hundreds of millions of dollars in eventual professional salary and
promotional opportunities,” in addition to the possible thousands, if not
millions, generated by using his image. 272 Therefore, although the potential
reward for the student-athlete may arguably increase as the value in his or
her image increases, the emphasis here turns on potential, which is still
speculative and fails to counterbalance the actual proven monetary reward
that the NCAA and its member schools receive. 273
F. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Epitomizes
the Importance of Student-Athletes’ Right of Publicity
Substantive unconscionability “turns not only on a ‘one-sided’ result,
but also on an absence of ‘justification’ for it.” 274 While the NCAA claims
to be a nonprofit organization and attempts to justify its actions through
“amateurism,” the fact remains that the NCAA is essentially profiting on
the millions of dollars that the student-athletes generate for them. 275 Thus,
while it is true that the skyrocketing costs at universities in a struggling
economy have recently threatened opportunities for athletes in “nonrevenue
sports,” the NCAA should not be given a blanket license to profit from
student-athletes on an exclusive basis, especially considering that athlete
images help generate billions in licensing fees.276 While the NCAA may
claim that it “needs to implement a holistic funding model that takes
revenue from more profitable sports,” this self-serving statement, combined
with the other unconscionable factors leads in strong favor of finding
unconscionability. 277
270. See id.
271. See Gary Gutting, The Myth of the ‘Student-Athlete’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2012,
8:30 PM) http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/15/the-myth-of-the-student-athlete/.
272. Johnson, supra note 155, at 44.
273. See Gutting, supra note 271.
274. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 2000)
(internal citation omitted).
275. See Karcher, supra note 234, at 108.
276. See Johnson, supra note 155, at 6.
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Moreover, there is no evidence that “an alternative right of publicity
term that provided compensation to student-athletes even after
graduation” 278 would undermine the amateurism goal in NCAA sports
because there is no evidence that merely receiving money for use of one’s
image makes that athlete non-professional. 279 While some courts, notably
the Fifth Circuit in McCormick v. NCAA and the United States Supreme
Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents, have stated the amateur character of
college athletics creates a unique product that would not exist if players
were paid, this was mere dicta and did not address the heart of the holding
in those cases. 280 Furthermore, those cases concerned antitrust issues, and
did not consider the doctrine of unconscionability. 281 It is true that the
NCAA provides a unique experience that allows student-athletes a wide
range of sports while receiving an education; however, even if the NCAA
believes it has a legitimate business reason for excluding athletes from
benefitting financially, that subjective reason is not enough to show that
paying the student-athletes undermines amateurism. 282
G. Policy Reasons in Favor of Finding the Contract’s
Unconscionability
These contracts clearly fit into the broader scheme of the
unconscionability analysis, especially since the very heart of the contract is
designed to “cure abuses in the natural bargaining process.” 283 While it is
not there to level the playing field, the very nature of the unconscionability
analysis is a vehicle that addresses bargaining power that is grossly

277. Id. at 41.
278. Id. at 42.
279. See generally Tyson Hartnett, Why College Athletes Should Be Paid, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tyson-hartnett/college-athletesshould-be-paid_b_4133847.html.
280. See McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir.
1988) (citing Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101
(1984)).
281. See McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343; see also Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468
U.S. at 101.
282. See generally Hartnett, supra note 279.
283. Johnson, supra note 155, at 48.
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unequal. 284 While arguably some imbalance is not enough, the issue turns
on gross imbalance that threatens to overturn the heart of contract law.285
It is true that the unconscionability doctrine only aims to preserve the
integrity of the bargaining process by identifying and correcting contracts
that resulted from an abuse of bargaining power. 286 However, abuse occurs
when a party with superior knowledge of the process has used that power to
trick or coerce the other party into making a deal that was not truly
voluntary. 287 It is clear the NCAA agreements fit these terms. 288 In re
NCAA Student-Athlete mandates student athletes have the power in their
images; therefore, court intervention is necessary to render the contracts
unconscionable to cure a defect in the bargaining process.289 While
declaring the contracts unconscionable increases the bargaining power of
the student and potentially alters the balance of power between the parties,
such a result is needed to eliminate NCAA’s current monopoly of
control. 290
It is also untrue that court intervention would interfere with the
general right to contract. 291 While courts can find unconscionability based
on youth and inexperience, it would not restrict student-athletes’ right to
contract at all, especially because youths can contract generally. 292 The
issue depends on one party taking advantage of the other, and such
intervention is unlikely to lead to widespread consequences of undermining
the economic efficiency of contracts.293 Instead, it would prevent an abuse
in the bargaining process, which is the ultimate aim of the

284. See Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 391 (3d Cir. 2007).
285. See Johnson, supra note 155, at 44.
286. See Vann v. Vann, 767 N.W.2d 855, 861 (N.D. 2009).
287. See Walker, 948 P.2d at 1130.
288. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271; see also Vann, 767 N.W.2d at
861.
289. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1284; see also Vann, 767 N.W.2d at
861.
290. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (2003).
291. See id. at 569.
292. See Mechs. Fin. Co. v. Paolino, 102 A.2d 784, 786 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954).
293. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note, at 290.
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unconscionability doctrine. 294
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit correctly denied EA’s anti-SLAPP motion, but left
open many unanswered questions regarding the state of the NCAA waivers
as a result of its holding. As a result, well-known student-athletes
potentially may be able to successfully challenge the contracts.295 Even the
average student-athlete can and should be able to successfully challenge the
NCAA waivers. 296 Where there is so little bargaining involved, it is simply
unfair to enforce a contractual provision that potentially assigns the
financial rights worth millions of dollars in exchange for a scholarship that
is not guaranteed.

294. See id.
295. See Paul Myerberg, Manziel’s Corporation Files Lawsuit to Protect ‘Johnny
Football’, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2013, 4:33 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/gameon/2013
/02/25/johnny-manziel-files-lawsuit-johnny-football-phrase/1946701/.
296. See Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, J.J. Morrison and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit
Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 277, 298 (2008).

